In the catalogues, shows and societies where breeders sought to establish their reputations science was widely discussed. 
The role of science: the capitalisation and professionalisation theses.
On a standard historical view of plant breeding, advances in scientific knowledge of plants were translated easily into progressively better plant varieties.
1 Countering this view, and writing from within a Marxian perspective, agricultural economist Jean-Pierre
Berlan has argued that scientific breeding methods were used instead to protect the intellectual property in plant varieties. He claims that in the years before the introduction of UPOV rights, "doing this legally was politically unthinkable", (Berlan [2000] , p.511, emphasis in the original).
With little hope of legislative change which would bring plants into the realm of patentable products, breeders, according to Berlan, turned to science to help them protect their varieties from piracy and recoup capital spent on breeding. What is more, these interventions produced increases in yield no greater than non-protective methods might have. Berlan"s main case studies are the use of hybrid maize from the 1930s and the development of terminator genes from the 1980s. 2 Hybrid maize varieties produced poor seeds, thus discouraging farmers from saving any for planting in the following year and inducing them to buy new stocks. At the same time, this feature of the new varieties blocked competitors from using the seed for breeding. Terminator genes achieved the same ends, by stopping the plants into which they have been transferred from reproducing. In both cases, as Berlan sees it, biological science allowed the penetration of capital into a market which had traditionally been poorly capitalised.
3 1 For what might be called the progressive history of plant breeding see Lupton [1987] , Murphy [2007] and Kingsbury [2009] . See also more cautious classics from Zirkle [1935] and Roberts [1929] . 2 Berlan [2000] uses the term "hybrid corn", although as he makes plain, this common denomination for a range of products and techniques is itself a misnomer; most corn, being cross-fertilised naturally, is hybrid. I use the term "hybrid maize" (following Berlan and Lewontin in other articles) to refer to the line of new varieties, initially derived from work by Shull, then developed by East and Jones and later commercially exploited by companies such as DuPont, including F1 hybrids, because in English the word corn is misleading, meaning "maize" in American English but "grain," including wheat, in UK English.
Let us call Berlan"s argument the "capitalisation thesis." A related but distinct argument, amounts to a "professionalisation thesis." Its author, in Britain, historian of science Paolo Palladino, has argued that the Mendelian theory that spread from 1900
provided an esoteric body of knowledge around which academic plant breeders and geneticists were able to professionalise. 1 With professionalization came academic security and a platform from which to argue for public funding. On Palladino"s analysis, the scientists who developed the techniques of Mendelian hybridisation became as professionally successful as they did largely because of their skill in presenting their breeding as rational, planned and scientific. So for Palladino, Mendelism played a role for academic plant breeders similar to that played by theories of disease and asepsis contemporaneously for medical practitioners. As Palladino puts it:
The establishment of a particular relationship between the work of science (genetic research) and technological practice (plant breeding) may have been an artefact devised by historical actors, in this case a budding community of geneticists, to advance the institutionalisation and professionalization of their particular branch of scientific enquiry. 2 Palladino further argues that as academic plant breeders used Mendelian genetics to make themselves appealing to civil servants, politicians and industry, they became estranged from the concerns of other plant breeders and farmers. What is more, the nationalised nature of the funding Mendelians secured marks for Palladino a radical discontinuity with previous breeders" work, enabling Mendelians to further separate themselves from the traditional concerns of the plant breeding community.
There is a great deal of overlap between the professionalisation and capitalisation theses. Both portray the use of science as a sort of fig leaf of respectability for activities which were actually aimed at securing money-either as returns of capital or as 1 Palladino"s interpretation echoes the classic US studies of professional institutionalisation of genetics in plant breeding contexts, Kimmelman [1983] and [1987] and Fitzgerald [1990] . 2 Palladino [1993] , p. 322, see also Palladino [1990] .
government funding-rather than improved varieties. 1 Undoubtedly there is much truth to both theses. However there is room for an extra layer of complexity in this picture, one that counters the extremities of Berlan and Palladino"s arguments. On the one hand, science wasn"t always used to protect intellectual property, in lieu of legislative methods, by ambitious breeders seeking to cut out seed saving and competitors. In the nineteenth century British plant breeders were up to something much more subtle. They were developing reputations, and in the process, using science. Berlan is glossing over details worth recovering by placing nineteenth-century British plant breeders into exactly the same category as the hybrid maize and terminator gene stories of the twentieth century.
On the other hand, Mendelian academic plant breeders weren"t entirely successful in cutting themselves off from the traditional plant breeding community. In the 1920s they were just as much concerned with their reputations amongst their plant breeding peers as were their predecessors. In both cases the shortcomings of the existing analyses, Berlan"s tendency to draw continuity and Palladino"s to draw discontinuity between nineteenth and twentieth-century breeders, can be overcome by paying closer attention to the moral nature of breeders" claims about their work and their varieties.
4. The role of science: the moral economy thesis.
I want to suggest that one important and previously overlooked area in which the relationship between science and plant breeding mattered was a moral economy of plant breeding. The term "moral economy" is drawn from social historian EP Thompson (Thompson [1971] ). For Thompson a moral economy described an alternative to the market economy when it came to setting the price of corn in British markets. He uses this distinction to provide analytic depth to the actions of groups of hungry men and women who responded to scarcities of corn in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Where other historians have described spasmodic mob riots caused by hunger alone, Thompson traces a much richer lineage to these collective actions. When groups of people gathered to demand corn to make bread, at reasonable prices, they were surprisingly organised and disciplined. Their actions often fitted a definite pattern, usually they acted in accordance with traditional paternalist schemes which included the idea that the basic necessities of life should not be the objects of profiteering. The disappearance of this tradition and the mob"s ability to demand a set price for corn, came, for Thompson, with the ascendency of the market economy, championed by the proponents of Adam Smith.
In the years since its coinage the term moral economy has been adopted by historians of science to describe the spheres in which the value of certain objects unavailable in the market economy are set. Such goods include intangible ideals such as empiricism, objectivity and accuracy and furthermore, means of regulating the relationships between scientists. 1 How can the notion of a moral economy help us better understand the role of science in making British plant breeding in the long nineteenth century profitable? My contention is that the value of breeders" varieties and reputations was gauged by an intricate system of publicity, shows and medals, reported on by a specialised press, and hosted by learned societies. The interactions which occurred in this world largely operated outside of the market economy. Furthermore, breeders" activities were at least partly codified by the morals of the plant breeding community in which they operated.
The community which sustained this economy was very big, and included a mixture of professionals and amateurs from all sections of society. One of the economy"s obvious features was the interaction between plant breeders and naturalists such as Charles
Darwin and Joseph Hooker in the nineteenth century, and as we will see, these interactions continued into the 1920s with the rise of the professional plant breeding scientist. However, the moral economy was not absolute, as breeders became more commercialised they increasingly operated in the market economy and the concerns of their fellow breeders became less important.
The moral economy of plant breeding is the context of interaction between science and plant breeding which Palladino and Berlan have exposed but left largely unexplored.
To that end the following case studies provide a window onto this historical feature of British plant breeding. We begin with the work of Major Hallett, a Brighton based wheat breeder. Berlan has pointed to Hallett"s work as an example of a new type of commercial strategy for plant breeders. Hallett"s work was not, however, a straight-forward rehearsal of later hybrid corn and terminator genes; the breeding method he used was not effective in cutting out pirates and savers of seed. Being aware of this deficiency, Hallett also courted the approbation of the moral economy of plant breeding, his varieties were a regular feature in the agricultural press and at the meetings of the BAAS.
In the second case study we turn to a subtle interplay between moral and market economies in the case of Culverwell"s Telephone pea. We will see the airing and resolution of a priority dispute between two sets of breeders, William Culverwell and the firm James Carter and Co., in the closing years of the 1870s. The relative scientific skills of the aggrieved parties formed a key part of the evidence put forward by both sides. In closing this case study we will see that by the last quarter of the nineteenth century the castigation of Carters in this dispute held less bite for a firm that was increasingly moving away from the moral economy and towards the market economy.
In the final case study we will see a major anomaly to this trend in the arrival of 
Major Hallett's Pedigree Wheat.
The attempt to raise a new variety of wheat more productive than the many old kinds, might have been thought until lately quite hopeless; but this has been effected by Major Hallett, by careful selection. (Darwin [1875] , p246).
Perhaps the most infamous of nineteenth-century British plant breeding methods was the pedigree method employed by Major F. F. Hallett. Based in Brighton, Hallett worked to improve wheat and barley varieties from the 1850s until the 1890s (Berlan [2000] Brighton where the selection is continued, and without which no "breed" of anything can be kept up." (Hallett [1887] ). In contrast, Hallett"s detractors claimed it was the garden soils which had the most effect on his varieties" yields.
For Berlan, although the details of Hallett"s story may differ from the hybrid maize story, the general pattern is the same; science was used as a means of protecting biological material which had traditionally circulated freely. In Hallett"s claims that growers had to return to him each year, Berlan sees a natural antecedent to the poor seeds of hybrid maize. Berlan"s views draw heavily from those of the world renowned botanist, and joint "re-discoverer" of Mendel, Hugo De Vries. De Vries"s himself, in the second edition of his popular botanist"s history of plant breeding, put the point like this:
[M]ethodical selection was assumed to produce races which could only be kept up Hallett"s strategy was, however, only effective to the extent that he could convincingly argue that his skills in selection were superior. Otherwise anyone could copy this relatively straightforward method for themselves.
In 1860 Hallett adopted the word "Pedigree" as a trademark and warned in his advertising, "Any infringements of this actionable, and will be severely dealt with".
Hallett felt he was forced to adopt a trademark as he believed, "The scientific discovery of the Law of development in Cereals, not being either a process or a mechanical invention a patent could not be obtained", (Hallett [1887] ). These trademarks were reproduced in Hallett"s advertising, placed on the stem of pictures of his wheat (Berlan [2000] ). However, the Major"s use of trademark, rather than confirming Berlan"s thesis, betrays the weakness of Hallett"s position. This relatively weak legislation offered little protection. If Hallett"s varieties had possessed the same biological properties as hybrid maize or terminator genes it would have been unnecessary.
In parallel with this attempt to secure formal rights Hallett also tried to secure informal attribution rights over the law of cereal development. This was the law which underwrote his method of selection. Accordingly he petitioned Charles Darwin to recognise his priority for this discovery. Indeed, the epigraph to this section was not a statement volunteered by Darwin. 1 Hallett was a skilled self promoter; his wheat appeared at the Great Exhibition of 1851, at the RAS and RHS"s shows, in the agricultural press and, significantly, at the British Association for the Advancement of Science (Kropotkin [1993] p. 179). As we"ve seen, the meetings of the BAAS were an important site for breeders wishing to establish their scientific credentials. The paper Hallett gave to the Exeter meeting in 1869, on the law of cereal development, was well received. The paper"s inclusion in the programme directly after a paper given by Maxwell Masters, then editor of the ubiquitous Gardeners' Chronicle, indicated the establishment"s acceptance of Hallett"s work (Hallett [1869] ).
Despite his best efforts, Hallett was unable to stop competitors using his varieties. Culverwell was in the right; Telephone was not distinctively different from the stock of Telegraph, but was merely an isolated sample of its wrinkled peas. The Chronicle's verdict was this, "To Mr Culverwell belongs the credit of raising and sending out
Telegraph-an undoubtedly fine Pea, and it is to be hoped we shall hear no more of the name Telephone." (Gardeners' Chronicle [1879] ). Credit was indeed at the heart of this dispute. Shows, prizes and certificates and the breeders" names with which they were associated were credited as evidence of a moral character which invited gardeners to trust. Mendelian plant breeder, whose fame is a little faded now, but at the time rivalled and even surpassed that of the breeders we"ve encountered so far, felt Carters breeding techniques and commercial strategies were morally contemptible.
Rowland Biffen's Mendelian varieties.
The twentieth-century development of publically funded Mendelian hybridisation has often been identified as marking a radical break in the history of plant breeding. We practical business men, if we have an idea, try to make money out of it; it is human nature, but the scientific man is always working for others without advantage to himself […] There is no patent, there is no copyright in seeds, and yet our scientific friends are spending the whole of their lives in seeing how they can help the farmers of this country. (Biffen [1924a] , p. 2).
This development certainly added a new slant to the moral economy in which previous breeders had operated.
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A statistical analysis of the success of Little Joss, Biffen"s first successful variety, is very difficult to reconstruct from aggregated agricultural returns. However, when Biffen was given the Darwin Medal by the Royal Society in 1920 it was claimed that Little Joss accounted for great swathes of the wheat acreage in Britain, (Nature [1920] ). Biffen made little money directly from the sale of seed, many were given away to his friends, but Little Joss"s success was still valuable to him. Two features of that success hark back to the previous case studies; the first is the shared location for its public demonstration.
Biffen"s varieties were publicly displayed and praised in very similar circles to Hallett"s wheat or Carters" Telephone. The second is the close association between Biffen"s varieties and their scientific underpinning. The theoretical frameworks applied to plant breeding by Hallett and Biffen might have been different, but in each case they operated with a similar ancillary effect, to support claims to the resulting varieties" superiority and reliability.
In 1911, William Bateson, the zoologist who had introduced Biffen to Mendel"s work, and a longstanding member of the RHS, announced to the Agricultural sub-section M of the BAAS meeting at Portsmouth:
Of the work which is making the Cambridge School of Agriculture a force for progress in the agricultural world the remarkable researches and results of my late colleague, Professor Biffen, based as they have been on modern discoveries in the pure sciences of breeding, occupy a high and greatly honoured place. (Bateson [1912] p.587).
In 1919 the RHS"s vice president, Sir Daniel Morris, talking to Botany Section K of the BAAS"s meeting at Bournemouth praised Biffen"s work as, "essential to the welfare and safety of the nation", men like Biffen, "workers in pure science", were, he argued, required to solve, "those problems of national importance which confront us", (Morris [1920] -Biffen [1913] , and personally through the flower breeding for which he and his wife Mary received prizes see Taylor and Wilkinson [2008?] and Taylor, Wilkinson and Hammett [2009?] laid claim to the most obvious form of protection placed upon the release of Yeoman II, the seal to be placed on the sacks in which it would be sold: "The attention of farmers is particularly drawn to the fact that genuine seed of Yeoman II can only be obtained in sacks closed with the seal of the National Institute of Agricultural Botany." (Biffen [1924b] , p. 512). Tenders were only to be made to the NIAB, a new institution, partly funded by government money, at which Biffen was initially honorary vice president, and later Chief scientific advisor. The seed was certified as genuine and superior by the NIAB seal on the sacks it was sold in. What is more, the price of the new seeds in any subsequent transactions or re-sales was set by Biffen and NIAB on the explicit understanding that this would prevent profiteers from acting immorally; by barring them from profiting from the products of public funds, and also barring them from profiting on the nation"s food supply-which had been the cause of much concern since the Great War. he saw something admirable in Hallett"s work. It was useful, he felt, because, "an honest account of his methods was given at the very outset. Such cannot be said of the work of some of his followers." (Biffen and Engledow [1926] p.8).
Concluding reflections.
In the three case studies presented here we have seen a subtle moral dimension at work.
In Major Hallett"s case his varieties had weak biological protection and weak legal protection; this pushed Hallett into seeking approbation from the plant breeding community for the scientific credentials of his methods. In Culverwell and Carters" case, even when there was little money directly at stake for Culverwell, he was greatly concerned with maintaining Telegraph"s reputation, and his own, against a perceived threat. In his dispute with Carters we saw something of the diversity and yet weakness of the moral economy which formed around plant breeding. Finally in Biffen"s case we saw how a moral dimension to plant breeding was rekindled in Biffen"s work to promote and protect his new, publically funded, varieties. For each of the breeders considered here the moral judgements of their peers carried some weight.
Two types of lesson emerge from these studies. The first type relate to our understanding of nineteenth-century plant breeding. With the concept of a moral economy in mind we are better placed to understand the differences between a breeder like Hallett"s work and the later developments of hybrid maize or terminator genes.
Nineteenth-century breeders were forced into a sort of collaboration which hybrid maize or terminator genes allowed later breeders to avoid. Bearing this concept in mind also helps us see that Biffen"s work and the ethos of selfless public service associated with it drew much from the work of previous breeders. The existing capitalisation and professionalisation theses, drawn from Marxian and social constructivist traditions respectively, having brought us this far in understanding these subjects, might usefully be supplemented with a more nuanced understanding of plant breeders" views on the moral nature of their work.
Finally, there are lessons to be gleaned here for our understanding of intellectual property and innovation more generally. Without patents or copyright to provide protection, plant breeders in the long nineteenth century produced a wealth of new varieties. So, the case studies in hand lend general support to those seeking to revise the view that patents were, and still are, a necessary and effective stimulus to innovation. In this patent-free context many breeders, working with the constraints offered by plants and the resources offered by their institutional environment, focused their efforts on securing credit and attribution rights, and building reputations. This paper has revealed the importance of science and morality to these breeders who were attempting, by sub-patent means, to protect and profit from their innovations. 
